The proofs of the theft of General Gamelin’s archives by the French Government

The proofs of the theft of General Gamelin’s archives by the French Government

General Gamelin’s personal archives, including the Journal de Marche du Cabinet Gamelin, made up of several volumes representing approximately 3,000 pages, in which he had noted his day-to-day activities until his dismissal, suffered the same fate as thousands of compromising archives since his notebooks and personal diaries contained in two large trunks, were stolen in the absence of his wife, by an officer sent by the Ministry of Defense, less than an hour after the death of General Gamelin at the Val de Grâce hospital – and even before Mme Gamelin was notified – this was just before the officers of the Vincennes archives could come and affix the seals to the doors of the accommodation.

Among the many witnesses to this theft, General de Cossé Brissac, in charge at the time of the Army archives, wrote a letter for the British historian Martin Alexander, summarizing the facts quite well.

Other witnesses, including the son of General Petibon, aide-de-camp to the Generalissimo, and Colonel Le Goyet, another guardian of the archives and author of a well-known biography of the Generalissimo entitled Le Mystère Gamelin, attested to the existence of these documents.

Let’s start with how General de Cossé Brissac presented the facts:


Letter of April 6, 1983 from General de Cossé Brissac to Mr. Martin Alexander of the History Department of the University of Southampton, following the theft of the Journal de marche du Cabinet Gamelin.

Mr Doctor,

I received your substantial letter of March 23, 1983. I know your high historical qualifications and I am very honored that Mr. Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen reported my name to you.

I read you with great attention and interest. This reading inclines me to admit the probability of the existence, then the disappearance, of a “Journal de marche” of Cabinet Gamelin.

I effectively headed the Army Historical Service at the Château de Vincennes, from 1953 to 1966 – on the death of the late Xavier de Virieu.

To my great regret, I cannot give you testimony different from that of Lieutenant-Colonel Le Goyet and Lieutenant Cadilhon, then in charge of our contemporary section, who took charge of the general’s documents, after the seals were lifted.

I remember having learned, quite by chance, from an unofficial source, the seizure of General Gamelin’s archives, at his home, by a team that I suppose was ministerial, immediately after the general’s death at the hospital in the Val de Grace. Death that the General was still unaware of.

Shocked by the brutality and incorrectness of such a process, I then had it at heart to let the Gamelin family know that our Historical Service was foreign to this measure.
I myself attended the general’s funeral at Val de Grace. When the seized papers were handed over to Lieutenant-Colonel Le Goyet, representative of the Historical Service, I reiterated to the family my concern to satisfy any requests they may have, within the framework of our regulations.

Lieutenant-Colonel Le Goyet reported to me, at the time, on the lifting of the seals which he had attended and on the inventory of the documents received, then drawn up by him.

I’m sure there was no trace of the March Diary, which you assume not without reason, the existence, then the disappearance.

I admit that your presentation makes me regret today not having shown more curiosity.

It is true that my previous work on the Second World War had mainly oriented me towards the German archives, and very little towards those of the former generalissimo.

Above all, we must not forget the circumstances that closely followed the death of General Gamelin: The collapse of a regime, the appearance of a new power with all the changes of teams, following this complete governmental renovation.

You will not be surprised, I hope, that I entrust the delivery of this letter to my friend and distant successor, General Delmas, who must not be unaware of its content.

Charles de Cosse Brissac


Excerpt from Volume No. 6 of the series The Great Lie of the 20th Century: The End of the Mysteries?

The Gamelin’s “papers”

“On January 21, 1958, General Gamelin, following a bad fall, was hospitalized in Val de Grâce. He is nearly eighty-six years old and his condition is serious. In his little room he will live three months of long agony. (-) He died on April 18 and Mrs. Gamelin had the painful surprise, on returning from Val de Grace, to find that the seals were affixed to the general’s office at her home, 55 avenue Foch in Paris. The Minister of National Defence, through the police commissioner of the 16th arrondissement, strictly enforced the regulatory texts (affixing seals). Colonel Consigny represented the Minister. »

We now know the exact circumstances of this “regulatory” application of the seals, since Colonel Consigny, who had had the apartment opened to him by the concierge in the absence of Mme Gamelin, was the only one who could have stolen the Journal walk and the general’s personal notebooks just before they are put down.

It was therefore only on June 4, nearly two months after the affixing of these seals, that Colonel Le Goyet took possession of what remained of the general’s archives: “On April 30, 1958, a ministerial decision prescribed Army Historical Service to assist a military magistrate in unsealing and recovering documents belonging to the Departments of National Defense and Foreign Affairs. I am designated to accomplish this mission, Lieutenant Cadilhon and Chief Warrant Officer Brun accompany me. The operation took place on June 4, 1958, in the presence of Magistrate Colonel Jallut, the 3rd class steward Falcout, the police commissioner of the 16th arrondissement in uniform, Madame Gamelin, two family members and an attorney. Everything is disorder… Papers taken out of drawers are scattered, others are piled up on the ground, others in dusty canteens… In silence we begin the first sorting. After an hour, I intervene with Colonel Jallut and suggest that he transport everything to Vincennes to the Historical Service of the Army with the agreement of Mrs. Gamelin and General de Cossé-Brissac. After having received the assurance that all papers that are strictly personal, or that have no historical interest, will be returned to her, and after having taken the advice of her solicitor, Mme Gamelin accepts. All the documents are boxed and loaded into a van. End of quote (Le Goyet The Gamelin Mystery page 369, 370, 371).

Thus, starting from the principle that a man in charge of collecting, studying, then classifying the archives of a general having commanded in chief cannot ignore the importance of his Journal de marche and his personal notebooks which are the major pieces , how to explain that this senior official, in his biography of General Gamelin, does not mention their disappearance???

That he is content, without further comment, to report the presence of Colonel Consigny on April 18?
That he does not mention Mrs Gamelin’s complaints to General de Cossé Brissac and the latter’s letter of apology formally acknowledging the theft perpetrated before the affixing of the seals, then prefers to describe the generalissimo’s office completely put upside down by this hasty excavation, as if it were the normal state of the place?
As for the reason for which he was chosen to see to the classification and proper recording of these archives, certain gossips, after noting the zeal with which he contributed to the writing of the official Bible, were able to see in it an excellent means of to filter these documents again, in case some pieces could have escaped Colonel Consigny, sent by Mr. Chaban Delmas at that time Minister of War in the government of Mr. Félix Gaillard.

The reader will therefore not be surprised that the recordings and reports written during the day of May 15, 1940 following the betrayal of the Georges – Billotte tandem, have also “disappeared” from the history of this battle, or that the testimonies and reports of “Sedan Ghost Tanks” being altered or “blowing away”.

Ultimately, and regardless of this new historical sleight of hand, one thing is certain: This testimony gives us the assurance that all the documents on this battle, stolen or not, and in particular those concerning the role that the Generalissimo held there, are currently in the possession of the French State, since General Gamelin took good care to specify that he was able to dispose of all his archives in order to write his Souvenirs: “In particular, I must review closely a whole series of notes carefully recorded day by day, by myself or by my staff. (-) I took care to accompany my notes and memoirs with all the supporting documents that I could find in the archives of my former private staff. I wanted these documents to be filed in the trial file. Well took it from me, because some of them were destroyed by the military authorities who had custody of them, (emphasis mine) when the Germans entered the free zone on November 11, 1942 “

Decidedly, it seems to be a mania for destroying archives among our military, and we now understand when these “authorities” were able to destroy all the documents having any connection with the information provided by Roessler and the others.

Morotte of the destruction that Gamelin must have known since: “fortunately I had double the essential originals. (-) My archives have been carefully preserved, almost complete, but I had to put them away as long as France was occupied by the Germans. There are also facts, or opinions, which it is better to expose only with a certain distance and when the passions aroused by the crises we are going through have lost their acuity. »
End of quote (Gamelin Servir Tome 1 Introduction page II)

And the report is clear… Apparently the “passions” are not cooled.

Knowing that the double of these documents was destroyed by the French when the Germans entered the free zone on November 11, 1942, and that it is appropriate to add to all these “unfortunate” disappearances the thousands of archives seized by the “allies Anglo-Saxons” who, according to my personal conclusions, still serve to exert the blackmail essential to the maintenance of the “family secret”, one will not be surprised at the ease with which the thesis of illogicality was able to impose itself.

Economic and geopolitical questions left unanswered by official history

Economic and geopolitical questions left unanswered by official history

“We believe we are dying for our country: we are dying for industrialists.”

Anatole France,   L’Humanité, July 18, 1922

This elementary truth, so deeply felt by the Peoples and fought so much by the media under the pretext of conspiracy theory, has, to be demonstrated, only to take into account the facts and archives, and especially the strange “blanks” left by the theoreticians of the absurd.

In reality, each of us suspects that deliberately excluding economic issues from history is indicative of the desire to cover our tracks. We all know that we have to look for “who benefits from the crime”!

Questions still unanswered in 2021

What the general public, on the other hand, does not know is the extraordinary violence with which these state lies are imposed.

Thus, in 2021, and if we only consider the period 1919-1945, the answers to the following questions, although known to experts and historians, have still not been provided to the general public:

  • Why have the “experts” of all persuasions “forgotten” that the rearmament of Germany, begun in the USSR in 1923, under the secret clauses of the Treaty of Rapallo, was financed and carried out by English banks and trusts and Americans who had massively invested in German and Soviet industry?
  • How is it that the gigantic arms complexes “secretly” set up in the USSR by these same companies were able to build, between 1922 and 1934, and this in complete violation of international treaties, munitions, bombs, chemical weapons, planes, guns, tanks, warships, and other submarines, which Hitler was going to use from 1937, to carry out his campaigns?
  • Why do historians apparently attach no importance to what was, for more than 10 years, a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Versailles and a major attack on the policies of détente and disarmament carried out both by the League of Nations and by the pan-European movement of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi?
  • How is it possible that a small inverted strike from the district of Schwäbing in Munich, without ideals, without culture and which had nothing of a warrior, came to power?
  • Why, when he had spent 4 years of war as a staff courier, far from the fighting, is Hitler still considered today, by many historians, as a “hero of the Great War”?
  • Why do the same historians forget his political commitment, when he was a soldier in the communist republic of Bavaria in 1920, elected convinced of a communist section in his regiment, and virulent to the point of being nicknamed “Addi the Red” ?
  • Why remove from any reasoning that the future leader of the Nazi party (NSDAP) denounced all his comrades, bringing them to the execution post, during the collapse of this republic, in order to save his life?
  • Why did he subsequently display such apparent hatred for Communism?
  • By virtue of what logic was it believed necessary to “forget” that he was put in charge by the leaders of the nationalist right of the secret services of the army, therefore of the big trusts – no doubt seduced by the capacities of exceptional adaptation of their new protege – to infiltrate the NSDAP, then to take the lead?
  • How was Hitler, then a simple political candidate with no personal fortune, able to finance the salaries and social contributions of a private army of 3 million men and the hundreds of meetings with great spectacles that made him famous, in a country ruined by its war debts and successive crises?
  • How is it that he was able to rearm Germany, remilitarize the Rhineland, carry out the Anschluss with Austria after having had its Chancellor assassinated, thus seizing gold reserves, armaments, raw materials? and Austrian factories, without firing a shot? All this with an army of operettas?
  • Which allowed him to support Franco militarily in Spain, thus opening up access to rare minerals from Spanish mines, then to seize Czechoslovakia and take control of its economy, without the great democratic powers lifting the little finger ?
    Why did the German Communist Party, following Stalin’s orders, help the Nazi Party to come to power by supporting it in three major elections?
    Why did Kurt von Schleicher, the “social general” who had presided, under the Weimar Republic, over the secret rearmament of Germany and the German-Soviet rapprochement, had he granted, on Stalin’s strong advice, forty million marks to the Nazis, in order to finance Hitler’s electoral campaign, while the party was on the verge of bankruptcy? Was his assassination during the Night of the Long Knives the way to make an embarrassing witness disappear?
  • How is it conceivable that commercial exchanges, and in particular the manufacture of arms by German factories on Soviet territory, continued between the USSR and the Nazi Reich, yet declared enemies since 1933?
  • Why did Stalin secretly initiate a rapprochement with the Third Reich, as early as 1935, when officially Hitler presented himself as the champion of the anti-communist struggle?
  • Why did Stalin eliminate from his army and his government all opponents of this rapprochement during the “bloody purges” of 1937?
  • Why did Heydrich and the Nazi secret services help him in this task, in particular by fabricating the false documents which would enable Marshal Tukhachevsky and the other supporters of an Anglo-Soviet alliance to be sentenced to death?
  • Why did German technicians and engineers continue to work secretly in the USSR, in German and Anglo-Saxon factories and companies, after Hitler came to power?
  • Why did the French government, also perfectly aware of Germany’s secret rearmament since 1923, do nothing to combat it?
  • Why did the great Lorraine metallurgists, even the most indomitable adversaries of Germany, like Mr. de Wendel, continue to supply their German counterparts Krupp or Thyssen, even after the Nazis took power, with all the steel necessary for manufacture their weapons, and this until 1939?
  • Why was the good quality coal that these steelworks needed delivered under the same conditions and without the slightest restriction, by the English industrialists?
  • Why did Sweden not apply any limits on the export of its steel?
  • Why did England and the United States act, as early as 1920, to politically isolate France and free themselves from the military commitments made to her, leaving their “Ally” alone in the face of the German danger?
  • Why was the “little alliance” uniting France and the Balkan countries, or even the Franco-Russian alliance, diplomatically opposed by the British?
  • Why did the English stubbornly refuse to consider an alliance with Russia from 1917 to 1939?
  • How is it that, a few days before the signing of the disastrous Treaty of Munich, Chamberlain, perfectly informed three times by the German generals that Hitler was going to be assassinated and the Nazi party decapitated, rushed into a plane, without even consult his own government, to land in Berlin and thus save, in full knowledge of the facts, the life of the dictator?
  • How have historians of all persuasions been able to dismiss from their reasoning that a few days before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, when the Prague Stock Exchange was logically collapsing, the world’s largest trusts rushed to buy back the shares of the largest Czech banks and companies?
  • That this process enriches in the same way the same “vulture” trusts, at the time of the other Hitlerian conquests?
  • That the investments of the German subsidiary of Unilever, a British industrial giant, increased from 20 million pounds sterling in 1930 to 37 million in 1939 and that the most intense period of investment corresponds very exactly to the takeover of Jewish companies, after the ‘Anschluss, then to the “Munich coup”, finally to that of Prague?
  • Why do historians omit to recall that France, the second colonial power after the British Empire, had been since the end of the 1920s the second world financial power, that it had the largest gold reserve after the United States? United, and in 1939 the most powerful army in Europe?
  • Why, when the Banque de France had been coming to the aid of the pound sterling in the midst of a debacle for years, did the British Minister of Finance decide, two days after having begged his French counterparts to buy back a few more million pounds , to devalue its currency, causing the Banque de France to lose millions of gold francs in one weekend?
  • Why did England rearm only partially and late, thus forcing France to rearm in 1932, and therefore to weaken its finances?
  • Why did the British government sign, in 1935, without consulting its French allies, a naval treaty allowing Hitler to rebuild a war fleet, again in complete contradiction with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles?
  • Why do we still let the general public believe that the German army was perfectly armed and at the cutting edge of technology, when the Reich could no longer finance its rearmament program since 1937?
  • Why did Stalin sign the German-Soviet agreement with such haste in August 1939, when he was well aware that, a few weeks later, Hitler’s attack on Poland should have been postponed for several months? because of the onset of winter rains? – Could it be because this “unfortunate haste” allowing the forces of the Reich to surprise the Poles in their mobilization, at the same time took the French by surprise in their effort of rearmament, and gave the Nazis the possibility of seizing the factories? and Polish weapons in order to complete their armament for the famous “Blitzkrieg”?
  • Why did Stalin refuse, in 1941, for almost 24 hours, to believe in the German attack on his country, until he received the official declaration of war?
  • Why did Hitler attack the USSR by refusing to carry out an anti-Bolshevik campaign, which would have ensured him the support of the population and the enrollment of anti-Communist Russian divisions, if his objective was really to eradicate communism?
  • Why do historians so easily “forget” the two betrayals committed against Czechoslovakia, then Poland, by the British and French governments? Two countries to which they were bound by numerous treaties giving all guarantees of military intervention, in the event of a German attack…
  • Why have we erased from official history the beginnings of a Europe officially founded in Brussels by the steel, coal and chemical cartels on September 30, 1926?
  • Why, in 2021, are the experts still silent about the cartelization of the entire European economy and the distribution of the areas of influence of each of these cartels in the world?
  • Why was the role played by these same European cartels in the 1920s and 1930s also kept secret in order to protect themselves from industrial competition from the United States and to ensure the political independence of Europe in the face of American demands? ?
  • Why do historians continue to claim that the “Prague coup” of March 15, 1939, determined Chamberlain to have no further dealings with Hitler, when in July of the same year, less than two months before the outbreak of the hostilities, his principal adviser, Wilson, and his trade minister Hudson, negotiated a loan of one billion pounds sterling to the Nazi Reich, (that is to say 200 billion pounds sterling in present value), the abandonment of the guarantees given to Poland , and the distribution of reciprocal zones of influence in the world?

Zones of influence” corresponding to those of the cartels in charge of creating the “new world order”.

  • Why did Montagu Norman, both President of the Bank of England and Director of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), deliver Czechoslovakia’s central bank gold to Hitler, when nothing was there? obliged, and this in complete disagreement with the conventions signed with this State?
  • Why was this same Montagu Norman never worried, when he was, throughout the 1930s, the unfailing support of Hjalmar Schacht, declared Nazi and President of the Reichsbank, who organized the currency and the economy of a Reich, then in full rearmament?
  • Why do historians see Herman Goering as an extravagant drug addict, when between 1934 and 1939 he became one of the richest men in the world with his cartel the “Herman Goering Werke?” »

A global cartel, with multiple international ramifications, of which there is curiously no trace in historiography.

  • Why have we “forgotten” that the greatest French industrialists delivered the steel and the raw materials essential to the rearmament of the Nazi Reich until the declaration of war?
  • Why does this amnesia also concern the so-called “neutral” countries which participated in the same way in this massive rearmament?
  • How is it that the proxies of the main leaders of the largest American trusts found themselves at the head of the German war industries? This both in the USSR from 1923 where thousands of deportees from the Gulags would die in their factories, and later in Nazi Germany, in the very heart of the concentration camps, where again thousands of deportees would die to enrich the shareholders. of these firms?

I am talking here about Ford Germany, IG Farben, IBM, General Motors (Opel), ITT, AEG and hundreds of other officially “German” factories but with 80% or 100% American capital whose the interests were often very strongly linked to the Cartel Herman Goering Werke and whose members of the boards of directors were called, among others, Bush and Kennedy, respectively fathers and grandfather of three Presidents of the United States.

  • Why fail to recall that the future President Roosevelt made a fortune in the 1920s by creating an investment agency for American funds in Germany?
  • Why were Messrs. Dawes and Young chosen to draw up the economic aid plans for Germany when they belonged to certain management committees of the major American cartels already mentioned?
  • Why was 80% of the capital allocated to Germany under these Dawes and Young plans actually allocated to these same American companies, themselves associated with the giant Cartel: Herman Goering Werke?
  • How can we explain that, as soon as Hitler came to power in 1933, the United States increased its oil deliveries to the Hitler Reich in full rearmament, quadrupling these deliveries between 1933 and 1939, if not to allow their arms factories to operate at full capacity?
  • Why did J.P. Morgan, the most powerful banker on Wall Street, choose John Foster Dulles, at that time a lawyer for IG Farben and who in 1926 would be executive director of Sullivan and Cromwell, the law firm of all the American cartels, to organize the establishment of these trusts at the heart of the European economy?
  • Why did Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler’s finance minister in charge of financing the “miracle” of German rearmament, remain in constant contact with J.F. Dulles throughout his mandate?
  • Why was the brother of the latter, Alan Dulles, appointed head of the American secret services in Switzerland, if not to ensure in the shadows the smooth running of commercial relations between the USA and the Reich?
  • How could we “forget” that IBM New York (with 100% American management and capital) supplied the Nazis from 1934, then throughout the conflict, with the punched cards, the computers and the necessary technicians to identify and file the Jews (going back to the 4th generation), or even the opponents and the mentally and physically handicapped, promised to sterilization or elimination?
  • That these machines, rented by IBM at exorbitant prices from the Reich, and used in the heart of the concentration camps, were essential elements in the proper management and application of the Shoa?
  • That these same computers made it possible at the same time to list and file all the industrial, commercial and private wealth of the occupied countries, in order to organize their systematic looting, to organize the logistics of the army down to the smallest detail, or even the files of the Gestapo and the various services of repression and control of the German people…

A totally impossible task without IBM machines and the very foundation of the mythical German “efficiency”.

  • Why on December 13, 1941, only two days after the Reich’s declaration of war on the United States, did Roosevelt issue, very discreetly, a presidential decree allowing American companies to circumvent the embargo on the Nazi Reich, in order to that they can continue to do business with the Axis countries, as with the neutral countries living on good terms with these same enemy countries, on condition that they have a special authorization?
  • What logic followed American investments in Germany when they soared from $450 million when war broke out in 1939 to $475 million when Germany declared war on the United States in December 1941? That same year, 553 American affiliates worked for Nazi Germany.
  • Why in the fall of 1941 did the New York Stock Exchange steadily rise as it became increasingly clear that the Nazi “lightning war” in the east was not going to end in victory?
  • Why the role of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), headed by an American, which launders gold from the banks of occupied states, the proceeds of looting, dental gold, or jewelry from concentration camps, is it still hidden to this day?
  • Why does official history forget to recall the role played by some of the largest American banks, such as Chase Manhattan or J.P. Morgan, as well as that of Swiss banks, in the repatriation of the profits made by these companies? weapons during the war?
  • Why were the BRI, like all the large Swiss, American, English, French, Dutch etc. private banks, which participated in this systematic plunder of Europe for the benefit of the large international trusts, not worried?
  • How is it conceivable, when Berlin was bombarded in July 1940 by British heavy bombers, that no German arms factory with American capital, although located within their radius of action, was affected and that those they were able to continue to produce the armament necessary for the Reich, throughout the duration of the war, contributing at the same time to prolonging the war against the USSR?…
    Who will explain why, when Hitler had sent Churchill, in May 1941, a peace proposal providing for: A general disarmament, at the same time as the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all German forces from the occupied countries, then the return democratic governments and free elections – this one was hidden from all the Allies by the British Prime Minister?
  • In the same vein, why was Rudolf Hess arrested as soon as he arrived? Then put incommunicado and held prisoner until his murder in Spandau prison in 1987, a few weeks before his release?
  • How is it that after the war, the few Cartels who suffered damage in the last months of the conflict, such as General Motors, or other large American companies, not only remained unpunished, but received compensation for the rare damage suffered by their German subsidiaries, following the British or American raids?

Compensation paid by governments, therefore taxpayers, German, French, or American…

  • How is it possible that IG Farben, which produced the ammunition, gasoline and rubber necessary for the German army throughout the war, IBM, Ford and General Motors (Opel) which built the tanks and trucks, or even ITT, which supplies all the electrical equipment, were able to resume their activities at the end of the war, in their factories intact, to participate in the reconstruction of Europe and the start of the Cold War?
  • How to explain that the Americans, who nevertheless had the possibility of landing in Europe from 1943, waited until 1944 and the inevitable victory of Russia, to engage in the West?
  • Why did they prefer to land in North Africa and the Middle East in 1942, if not to secure Iranian and Iraqi oil and access routes to Syria and North Africa, while blocking a possible Soviet advance towards this area? rich in oil?
  • Why is the Chinese and Eastern issue, essential for American tankers, as for the British Empire, so often “forgotten” by historians?
  • Why is the animosity between the USA and the British Empire in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly with regard to the same oil issues, completely concealed, when it was on the verge of degenerating into armed conflict?
  • Why were the largest French refineries all bombed and destroyed by the Anglo-Saxons, when they had no more oil to refine for a long time?
  • Why did the “experts” of all persuasions so easily “forget” the reception given at the Waldorf Astoria in New York on June 26, 1940, the day of France’s defeat? Rejoicings attended besides the German trade delegation, led by Gehrard Westrick: Mr. Edsel, the son of Henry Ford, representing the Ford factories. Representatives of General Motors, IBM, General Electric, Eastman Kodak, ITT, Standard Oil, accompanied by their lawyer in Germany. James D. Mooney, head of foreign investments at General Motors and its CEO, Alfred P. Sloan, who had this “good word” which we will admit reflected the thoughts of all the guests: “The democratic countries of the world have unintelligent leaders. No… Stupid, and short-sighted… So it’s only natural that democracies have to pack up when an alternative system comes along with leaders who are strong, smart, aggressive, who make people work longer and more actively and who have gangster instinct. And, indeed, it seems that now the democracies are no longer in the race. Five days later, the Nazi victory was again celebrated with great pomp, again at the Waldorf, this time by Rieber, big boss of Texaco and great friend of the fascists, Germans, Europeans and Americans. Once again, we saw the elite of international high finance crowding there, celebrating this economic windfall, this new advance in their European interests…


  • Why, for 70 years, have the secret services, mainly English, destroyed thousands of compromising documents? Murdered (sorry, you probably had to say “suicided”) key witnesses and maintained a leaden screed on the truth?
  • How is it that the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been a “surprise” for the American navy, when the British cipher services knew perfectly and without the slightest possible doubt the place of the attack, and this two days in advance?
  • Why was the “Octagon System” that allowed the CIA and ex-Nazis to exfiltrate the Nazi war chest so carefully camouflaged to this day?
  • What was the role of Chancellor Adenauer in the rearmament of Germany and the “Octagon” system, which used SS gold to finance his political party, the CDU, subservient to the USA?
  • Who wanted and started the Cold War? And why ?
  • Finally, why have those who write History for the Peoples so casually “forgotten” the warning issued on January 17, 1961, by President Eisenhower, when he was about to leave power, against the power of the military-industrial lobby: “We must be wary of unwarranted influence, whether intended or not, by the military-industrial complex. The risk of a fatal increase in the abuse of power exists and will persist. Let us never let the weight of this complex endanger our freedoms or our democracy. »
  • And this corollary question: Why was J.F. Kennedy assassinated when he was preparing, on the advice of President de Gaulle, to end the war in Vietnam?

Everyone will have understood it, I could continue this list on many pages, but I had promised to stick to the Second World War…

“We never lie as much as before the elections, during the war and after the hunt”, used to say Georges Clemenceau, and one observation is essential in 2021: The line remains correct, since the works published to date do not answer any of these questions in a synthetic way.

While the facts are perfectly known, the archives have been opened, the books written, the proponents of “Official History”, avoid criticizing them, modestly turning their eyes away from the work of their colleagues and the indisputable reality of the archives. , for lack of being able to mention them without compromising the interests of those who remain the “Masters of the Planet”, and whose names have shone continuously for more than a century, at the tops of the tallest buildings.

To these essential questions, which in turn generate so many others, the “experts” answer:

“Evil genius, reign of terror, fault of the German people, envoy of the Devil, racist ideology, incomprehensible madness, fatal illogicality” and other hazy explanations.

In reality, all this is a tall tale, by which the accredited authors accumulate honors and official recognition, because there has never been a war without, at its origin, a basely self-serving intention, a well-ordered financing, and a perfectly determined will.

No “fatality” has ever been taken into account, and the Second World War and its sixty-five million victims, did not break the rule, despite all the smokescreens that we fought to deploy for 70 years.

This is why the entire history of the 20th century can be summed up in two strong ideas:

  • The first is economic with the emergence of new economic powers and the opening of new markets. (Germany, Russia, China)
  • To manage them as well as possible, the big global trusts have organized themselves into cartels and have shared the planet in order to avoid competing with each other. Each cartel has its Zone of Influence.
  • It was in order to oppose the ever-increasing stake taken by Anglo-Saxon cartels in German companies that their European counterparts came together to try to put an end to the “infiltration” of their industries.
  • Hitler put himself at their head, thus defying his former Anglo-Saxon sponsors, and there was war.

  • The second major fact is social.
  • A new conception of social relations in opposition to old values ​​and conservative powers had appeared with the century.
  • Their spearhead: Communist and socialist ideas. Skilful maneuver orchestrated by big international “black” capital in order to order to their advantage the ideas of freedom, social justice and democracy. Because everything in economy, therefore in politics, is a matter of legitimacy, therefore manipulation of opinions and Peoples.
  • The third data is ideological, since it was necessary to find the pretexts able to mobilize Peoples already strongly tired by the First world war and having no desire to repeat the same errors.

This is why the Great Stateless black capital, tax evader and instigator of wars and revolutions of all kinds financed Communism and Fascism, two forces apparently contradictory, but only capable of blinding the Peoples made vulnerable by the economic disorders that succeeded the Great War.
It is these upheavals that will decide everything.

This is what we must remember if we want to understand why billions were invested in war material and why hundreds of millions of human beings were sacrificed, during the bloodiest century in history.



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Questions left unanswered by “Blitzkrieg” theorists

Questions left unanswered by “Blitzkrieg” theorists

“The blitzkrieg relied on the existence of ‘helpful enemies’ who would not just make mistakes but the right mistakes. »
End of quote (D.E. Showalter 1940 French defeat, German victory under the eye of foreign historians page 38)

Or, in opposition to Mr. Frieser’s “incomprehensible” Blitzkrieg thesis, the basis for a proper betrayal…

Thus, the revelation of the French military betrayal of May-June 1940 makes it possible to lengthen the list of questions left unresolved by the accredited “experts”:

  • Why, since the opening of the archives of the Battle of France in the year 2000, have none of the historians who have established their reputation and published so many books on this battle suddenly given up writing on the subject?

  • Why did the French State not return, at the same time as these archives, all those it stole under Vichy and in the immediate post-war period?

  • Why has no investigation been carried out for eighty years concerning the infantrymen of the “special cagoulard sections” and their “ghost” tanks who attacked the French blockhouses on the heights of Sedan on May 13, 1940

  • Why were these blockhouses blown up during the occupation, if not to try to erase all traces of these reverse attacks?

  • Why did Hitler impose during the same period a “prohibited zone” extending from Sedan to Dunkirk, all along what was later called “the Panzer corridor”?

  • Prohibition which left hundreds of corpses to rot on the spot without being able to be buried!
    Could it be because some curious people could have discovered men and tanks there that had no business there?

  • Why were the main military leaders, all members or sympathizers of the Cagoule, at the origin of the collapse of the French armies in 1940, appointed to important positions under Vichy and decorated with the francisque?

  • Why was Pétain, perfectly identified by police investigations and the secret services as the secret leader of the Military Cagoule, cleared by Daladier who personally threw his file into the fire so that no trace of it remained?

  • Why was Marx Dormoy, Minister of the Interior of the Popular Front who had ordered these investigations into the Cagoulard plot, first arrested by Vichy, then assassinated by La Cagoule?

  • Why in Germany, after Nuremberg, did they rush to execute all those who could have testified?

  • Why in France, have we organized rigged trials, carried out with a bang by their former accomplices, and in some cases, as for Laval, by organizing real judicial assassinations, if not for the sole purpose of silencing those who would have had the opportunity to reveal a certain truth?

  • Why did we find, a few years after the war, many of Vichy’s collaborators, among the most culpable, in key positions in various state apparatuses of the Fifth Republic?

  • Why were hundreds of former Nazis elevated to equally important positions in Germany?

  • Why did the US Secret Service hire ex-Nazis after allowing them to escape the purge?

  • Why did none of the “Blitzkrieg theoreticians”, for eighty years, give the slightest credit to the works of French and foreign generals who clearly denounced military treason?

Finally, the ultimate question: If historians chose tomorrow to answer these questions, wouldn’t the understanding of the world in which we live be completely upset?

The truth about the superiority of the Reich’s military industry

The truth about the superiority of the Reich’s military industry

Following the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany having lost its colonies and vast territories in Europe, raw materials were sorely lacking.
Of the 30 materials necessary for the manufacture of weapons, the Reich possessed only seven in sufficient quantity, while nickel, zinc, tungsten, molybdenum, chromium, beryllium, platinum and bauxite were completely lacking.

There was also a monthly shortage of 600,000 tons of steel, which in December 1939 led General of the Infantry Karl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, Chief of the Logistics Section of the Wehrmacht General Staff, to write a memorandum specifying that No attack on the Franco-Belgian fortified front would have the slightest chance of success before the spring of 1942.
Here is what Mr. Tooze writes on this delicate subject: “The production of ammunition for the infantry plummeted. The manufacture of mortar bombs ceased altogether in the spring of 1939. The production of artillery shells continued but without copper guide strips.
And ammunition production was not the only one affected.

The shortage of structural steel was such by the end of 1939 that 300 infantry battalions had no proper barracks or garages. The German army had taken on such dimensions that it could no longer be accommodated except under tents. In July 1939, the cuts even affected the army’s weapons programs.

Original plans for 1939 – 1940 called for the production of 61,000 Model 34 machine guns, the new light machine gun that was to give infantry squadrons their basic firepower. After the reduction of the army’s steel quota, this target was reduced to only 13,000.

Similarly, targets for the 10.5 cm light field howitzer, the centerpiece of the German artillery, were reduced from 840 to 460. Production of the classic 98K infantry carbine was to cease completely from in the fall of 1939.

Perhaps most spectacular in the light of subsequent events was the tank program which planned to produce 1200 main battle tanks between October 1939 and October 1940 and which was then cut in half. A total of 34 of the 105 wartime divisions would be severely under-equipped. Of the replacement units responsible for training new recruits, only 10% had weapons. (-)

The Wehrmacht’s ammunition stocks only covered 14 days of intense fighting. The Luftwaffe was similarly affected.
In contrast to the expansive visions of 1938, 1939 was a year of reversal. (-) The 1939-1940 targets were gradually reduced, as was the range of aircraft included in the plans. (-) From January 1939, Plan 10 reduced the target to 8,299. Developed in July 1939, Plan 12 further reduced it by 20% for all aircraft other than the JU 88. In order to preserve the latter program , Plan 12 envisioned the accelerated phase-out of older designs like the JU 87 Stuka. »

And this catastrophic situation at the beginning of 1939 was to deteriorate further: “Instead of an ‘ideal’ maximum of 375 million cartridges of infantry ammunition per month, the allocation of raw materials, starting in July 1939, would allow production of less than 37 million. Instead of 650,000 3.7 cm anti-tank rounds per month, German industry would produce only 39,000. Instead of 450,000 shells per month for light howitzers, 56,300.

The graph (-) which was presented to Hitler in July 1939 shows that if the production of armament had reached a maximum peak of 80 in March 1939, it had fallen back to 15 in July and that there would be no possibility to increase it in view of the current state of the supply of raw materials and in view of the finances of the State.

Germany therefore produced practically no more weapons from July 1939 and would no longer have the means to produce them for a very long time. She is bankrupt. And Hitler knows it perfectly. (-)
Between September 1939 and January 1940, after a first recovery from the trough reached in the summer of 1939, German ammunition production stagnated. The situation in the Luftwaffe sectors, where the severe cuts of the summer of 1939 soon showed their full effect, was even worse. »

End quote (Tooze The Wages of Destruction Pages 304, 305, 314, 341)    

According to Colonel Goutard: “To this was added in the aeronautical industry a complete ignorance of the most elementary rules of national production, writes Colonel Werner Baumbach[1]. One could have imagined that under a controlled production regime, each company was specialized: Messerschmitt building fighters, Junkers heavy bombers, Heinkel medium bombers, etc. However, each manufacturer made it a point of honor to appear in all the compartments! Messerschmitt built both fighters, “giant” transport planes, reconnaissance aircraft, bombers, gliders etc….

At Junkers, the dispersion was even scarier! The effort was spread over multiple models: 17 types and three variants for 1939! And Goutard concludes: If errors were made in the French production, they were largely compensated by the errors of the German production! »

End of quote (Colonel Goutard The war of lost opportunities page 63)

So the question is: How could this legend of the superiority of the German army have endured for so long?

The official nonsense based on the statements of the generals responsible for the defeat

To find out, let’s turn to the artisans of the fable, those who founded official history by writing the score from which historians had to tune their pens.
I am quoting here General Georges, No. 2 in the French army, in charge of the North-East front in May 1940, but also, as we will see, the main architect of the betrayal.
In his preface to the book of “Memories” of General Roton, his chief of staff, he states: “I have said it and confirm it: Germany had in 1940 a large superiority in armored division and an even more overwhelming superiority in aviation (hunting and above all bombardment). In order to respond to this, it would have been necessary to have the same means available. But we were poor in armored formations, poorer still in aviation. Moreover, the absence of reserve armored equipment, the performance of our manufactures, insufficient from the start and gradually reduced as the invasion progressed, deprived us of essential spare parts due to wear and tear. quickly from our own armored formations. So that, each day, their power was decreasing, while the Germans, well provided with replacement material, could maintain in battle their ten “Panzers”, constantly replenished. »

End of quote (Preface from General Georges to General Roton Crucial Years page XI)

So much for the authorized version, which postulates the weakness of the French armament, with regard to the “Kolossale” German power, going so far as to claim that the German equipment was constantly renewed, whereas the French could not replenish theirs. . Which, according to the records we know of and the most recent studies, is the exact opposite of the truth!!

However, how can we imagine that General Georges, commander-in-chief on the North-East Front, or Roton his chief of staff, did not know perfectly the exact count of their troops and their weapons, just like that of their adversary?

Real figures yet accessible from 1956

To answer General Georges, Colonel Goutard went up to the battlements: “But what do we know about this enemy army? One of the most curious characteristics of the memoirs of our generals and of the reports of official or conformist historians is the ignorance in which they leave us of the real situation, material and moral, of the German army in 1939 and 1940. As it has conquered us, they present it to us as a formidable and irresistible instrument. »

End of quote (Goutard The war of lost opportunities page 12)

Then he gives us in 1956 a state of the French armament, very comparable to that which we finally admitted, confirming to us that the French army had largely caught up:

“The “four-year plan” and its addenda were to make it possible to create two armored divisions and a third light mechanical division, to increase the number of motorized divisions to 10 and the number of independent tank battalions to 54. (-) However, the following quantities left production before the end of May 1940:

Heavy tanks B: 387 For a program of 396.

Medium tanks D: 260 (not included in the 1936 program).

Light tanks (R, H, or FCM): 2791 For 2430 planned.

Canon of 25: 6000 Made according to the direction of the manufactures,
4558 according to Gamelin.
6200 according to program management

Canon de 47: 1280 initial program of 612, increased in 1937 to 2160.

Mortars of 81: 5000 for a program of 4800.

Mortars of 60: 5000 according to General Gamelin.

6200 according to the manufacturing department
For an initial program of 4000, increased in 1939 to 6000.

Caterpillar: 4300 according to General Gamelin.

6000 according to the manufacturing department

For a program of 5000.

End of quote (Goutard, The War of Lost Opportunities pages 48, 49 and 50)

Figures to which may be added 3,500 Citroën-Kégresse half-tracked vehicles, 2,500 wheeled Laffly tractors, 500 Lorraine infantry tankettes. That’s a total of more than 12,500 specialized vehicles.

Thus, as Colonel Alerme, despite being a collaborationist and declared supporter of the Marshal, confirms: “The combatants of 14-18 had ended the war with means that outweighed those of their adversaries. However, in the fall of 1939, our army still possessed these means, perfected, modernized, for a large part, also multiplied. The corps of troops, the arsenals, the magazines and the depots had an armament which amounted to more than four hundred billions. (-) It cannot be claimed that we were poorly armed”.
End of quote (Colonel Alerme The military causes of our defeat)

This rearmament effort had been carried out by the socialist government under the presidency of Édouard Daladier who, with the help of his Minister of Armaments Raoul Dautry, organized and rationalized production by nationalizing certain companies, by building up large stocks of materials strategic raw materials, by modernizing tools and decentralizing production sites outside foreseeable combat zones. This allowed a rapid doubling of production capacity.

As for the comparative quality of these materials

Concerning the tanks, let us take again the demonstrations of Mrs. Frieser and Lormier.

In their respective presentations we note without surprise that the German specialist will find more qualities in the French tanks, in particular in terms of shielding and armament, in order to question the supremacy of the Panzers, while Mr. Lormier will estimate the German armored , faster and more lively in manoeuvre, less fuel-hungry, in order to highlight the courage and quality of the French crews.

These are the normal reflexes of authors. There is nothing surprising or open to criticism in this way of dealing with the subject because, in the end, these historians are honest and perfectly in agreement in recognizing that the Somua and the French B and B1 tanks were superior to the best German tanks, that only the 75mm guns of the Panzer IVs had a chance of penetrating their armour, while the French 47mm gun could pierce all those of the Panzers.

Remember that the Panzer IV, the most powerful German tank, had 30 mm armor, while that of the French B tank was 60 mm and that of the British infantry tank Matilda, was 80 mm.

Which situates the problem, because if the 400 French Somua tanks equipped with a sloped armor of approximately 50 mm in cast iron of high quality and specially profiled to make ricochet the shells were, according to Mr. Lormier “considered as the best armored vehicle of this beginning of world war, (-) perfect compromise between firepower, speed, autonomy and protection. It outperforms its German opponents in many ways,” and while the B1 heavy tanks were practically invulnerable, they will bizarrely run out of fuel in the middle of the fighting when, by some extraordinary measure, we manage to get them to line up.

This we will see in detail[2], when studying the various acts of the battle.

In the meantime, let’s see what the German tanks were really worth: The Panzer 1, originally a training vehicle, was only armed with two machine guns. The Panzer 2, armed with a weak 20 mm cannon, was clearly insufficient even against the Allied armored cars.

These two light models represented almost two thirds of the Panzers during the Battle of France.

In the range of medium and heavy tanks, the Panzer III and the two Czech models were only equipped with a weak 37 mm gun, and although many models had been transformed and armed with a long gun, the Panzer IV, yet considered to be at the cutting edge of German technology, in its original version only carried a short 75mm gun and therefore had very limited accuracy and range.

According to Dominique Lormier, it was only effective against the French D2, Somua S35 and B1bis tanks, but had to approach as close as possible to the enemy tanks to have a chance of hitting them and even at this distance, had only little hope of piercing the armor of Allied heavy tanks.

General Halder, speaking of his Panzers, judges them thus:

– Pz I: only good against a weak and demoralized enemy.

– Pz II: slightly better, not good against tanks.

– Pz III: good against enemy tanks. The effect of his weapons is weak. Same remark against enemy infantry.

– Pz IV: good against enemy tanks. Good effect of his weapons also against enemy infantry. »

In conclusion, the great mass of the German light tanks Type: Pz I and II, were completely ineffective against the allied tanks and even against their armored cars, more strongly armored and more mobile.
Thus, to estimate the forces in presence, it is enough to regulate the problem of the number of tanks P 1 and P2 put in line.

For example, Mr. van den Bergh, counted 2389. Then added 429 Pz III, 296 Pz IV and 391 Czech tanks, and there the figures correspond to those of Frieser or Wikipedia.

And that is the main thing, since these 1,116 heavy and medium Panzers will be the only ones capable of combat against the 735 French heavy and medium tanks of the Somua and B1 type, and the 1,400 Renault R 35 and R 39 tanks.

Or a balance of power more than double for the allies!
We can therefore estimate, as all historians have agreed today, that the fight was rarely unequal because of the quality, or the quantity of the material.

I am therefore in a position to cite here some figures given by Mr. Karl Heintz Frieser (The Myth of the Blitzkrieg: pages 51 to 53 and 59 to 64) around which there finally seems to be a consensus, since they are used both by the English and the Germans: (Jacobsen, Fall Gelb- page 258 – 259; Umbreit: The Battle for hegemony » page 279), and even the Canadians like Benoit Lemay, or the Frenchman Dominique Lormier, who almost manage to agree on the essentials.

Regarding the number of divisions:  
For the Germans: 135 divisions, including 42 very poorly equipped and trained reserve divisions. Note that at the start of the campaign only 93 divisions took part in the assault.

For the French: 104 divisions, including 11 reserve divisions.

For the British: 13 divisions, three of which were not complete, but to which should be added two other divisions, including the first armored, which will be brought to the front during the battle.

To these Franco-British divisions must also be added 22 Belgian and 10 Dutch divisions.

That is to say on May 10, 1940, a total of 135 German divisions, against 151 allied divisions.

Regarding artillery:

For the Germans: 7,378 guns
For the French: 10,700
For the British: 1,280
For Belgians: 1,338
For the Dutch: 656

That is a total of 7,378 German guns against 14,000 for the allies.

Regarding tanks:

For the Germans: 2,439 tanks
For the French: 3,250 tanks out of a total of 4,111 without counting the 250 stationed in the colonies.
For the British: 310 tanks on May 10, to which must be added the 330 tanks of the first armored division which will land by the end of May. That is a total of 640 tanks
For the Belgians: 270 tanks
For the Dutch: about 40 tanks  

That is a total of 2,439 German tanks against the 4,204 Allied tanks.

In reality, if the Allied tanks were destroyed en masse, it was essentially: Either because they were not supplied with gasoline, or because they were hit by German bombers, in particular the Stukas.
And the question arises: Why did the Panzers not have to suffer the same attacks? Bringing an unambiguous answer: Simply because the French planes were not there.
While in reality, again, there were more of them…

Regarding aviation

According to the official version, the German supremacy in the air was due to a lack of aircraft on the Allied side, as well as the obsolescence of the equipment and the inexperience of the pilots.

So let’s first consider the total number of aircraft each country had, then those that will actually be engaged during the battle:

For Germany: 3,864 combat aircraft in total.
Of these: 2,756 only ready to intervene.
But of this figure we must remove those who were in line in Norway, so there are 2,589 planes left for the French front.

For France: 3,562 combat aircraft in total (2,402 fighter aircraft and 1,160 bombers) to which must be added 1,464 reconnaissance aircraft, therefore a total of 5,026 aircraft.
Among these: 879 only ready to intervene on the North-East front.

For Great Britain: 1150 combat aircraft in total
Among these: 384 stationed on the French front. Other responders as needed from UK bases.

For the Belgians: 140 combat aircraft in total.
Among them: 118 ready to intervene

For the Dutch: 82 combat aircraft in total.
Among these: 72 ready to intervene.

That is a total of 2,589 German planes engaged on the front, against only 1,455 Allied planes.

These are technically comparable aircraft.

Here we see that the advertised German supremacy is in effect in the air on May 10, but considering the figures for the total forces available, the Allies had far more aircraft at their disposal. In particular more than 5,000 for France. And of course, we will wonder where they went…

Excerpts from Volume No. 1 of the Great Lie of the 20th Century Series: French Military Treason. – 80 years of state lies.

[1] Werner Baumbach: Zu spät! Richard Pflaum Verlag, Munich. At the end of the war, Colonel Baumbach commanded all of the German bombing aviation.

[2] See volumes 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6