One of the first explanations presented by world historiography to accredit the “surprise effect” of the Blitzkrieg was, as we have seen, the alleged inefficiency of the French secret services which would have left the high command in the dark, both of the capabilities of the German army than the successive plans adopted by Hitler.
A preposterous thesis that should now be analyzed carefully, in order to leave no doubt on this decisive point.
Knowing that the most well-known and effective German informants were very high-ranking officers, belonging either to the OKH (Army Headquarters) or to the OKW (Army Headquarters), who were going to betray the Nazi Reich out of patriotic conviction.
It is therefore appropriate to cite the most striking example of their effectiveness:
The Viking network (Lucy for the Anglo-Saxons) led by a certain …
During the First World War, this German officer became friends with other Democratic officers.
A few years later, in 1933, disgusted by Hitler’s rise to power and on the advice of his friend Xavier Schnieper – son of a Lucerne State Councilor and Swiss SR officers – he emigrated to found Lucerne a small publishing house, the Vita Nova Verlag, which will serve him to publish perfectly documented articles analyzing from 1933 the policy of the Reich and denouncing Hitler’s projects. All information obtained from his friends, who remained in the army and reached important positions of responsibility.
The coded letters that he receives as well as the frequent visits of his contacts allow him to obtain political and economic information that he publishes in his newspaper under the pseudonym of “Hermes”.
A few months before the declaration of war in September 1939, Roessler, contacted by Colonel Masson, head of the Swiss intelligence services, agreed to stop publishing this information in his newspaper, to communicate it directly to the Swiss services.
At this time the network is structured around a few men:
1° Xavier Schnieper, who recommended Roessler to Colonel Masson, and will become his dealing officer.
2° Colonel Masson, head of the Swiss SRs, himself pro-allied, unlike the head of the army, general Henri Guisan, pro-German. This opposition will force Masson to take risks.
3° Captain Hausamann who, before the war, set up a press service disguising an intelligence network bearing the code name “Bureau HA”.
Hausamann sent Masson daily, through Captain Max Weibel, head of section 9 of the Swiss SRs, the information he obtained daily from Roessler.
He provided the same information to Colonel Barbey, General Guisan’s chief of staff, as well as to the French, British, Belgian, Dutch and Norwegian SRs through Captain Sedlacek (code name: Uncle Tom), a former Czech SR, emigrated to London.
The information therefore reaches ALL the Allies, as well as all threatened neutral countries, as we will see again throughout this investigation.
The coded letters easily passed censorship and, in an emergency, telephone conversations made it possible to transmit Hitler’s latest decisions.
The “Viking Network” which, for the Allies will become the “Lucy Network”, will thus operate throughout the duration of the conflict.
The only condition imposed by Roessler: Never reveal the names of his comrades.
Moreover, even today, no one can claim to know with certainty the names of these German heroes. According to the CIA, in addition to Gersdorf and Thiele, “there is a connection to Generals Wirth, Mueller, Lemmer, Gisevius, Horkheimer, probably Thormann, and possibly Joachim Oster.”
In reality, no one, apart from Roessler, has ever known who precisely these men were sufficiently high up (among “the five”) to be able to know the most intimate decisions of the Führer, almost in real time.
The historian and journalist Pierre Accoce crowned by numerous prizes for his works, and at that time investigative journalist at the Express, unveiled the first in 1965 in his bestseller translated into several languages: The War has been won in Switzerland, the existence of what was the most mysterious network of the Second World War.
As he personally confirmed to me in 2012 during a long filmed interview, in 1963 he met the survivors of the Viking network and interviewed, during his investigation of more than a year, many members of the Swiss secret services who worked with Roessler, who died in 1958.
Among them, Schnieper, of course, and the widow of Rudolf Roessler, but especially Colonel Masson, with whom he will have several interviews first in Lausanne, then at his home in Vevey.
He will testify to his relations with Major Gaston Pourchot, Deputy Military Attaché at the French Embassy.
Testimony which can be summed up in a few lines: “The base of the French intelligence services in Switzerland was located on the first floor of the French consulate, rue Sulgenheim in Bern. Commander Pourchot was assisted by Commander Trichet, Captain Mathiot, Lieutenants Duroux, Talichet, Nappey.
This “Pourchot network” had branches in Basel, Zurich, Lausanne, Geneva. About fifty agents in 1940, then 250 specialists from 1942, when the network became the annex of the clandestine national network “Kleber”.
Concerning the engagement of this capital witness that was Commander Pourchot, let us specify that he organized the escape of General Henri Giraud in December 1940, with Colonel Masson and the Alsatian resistance networks, that in 1944 he will be decorated by the General Bethouard for his clandestine action, then received the Legion of Merit in 1946, and some high US decorations with congratulations from President Truman for having transmitted vital information to the Allies until 1945. (He had been contacted in 1942 by Allen Dulles, OSS agent commanded by US General Donovan, and ancestor of the future CIA)
Pourchot and Roessler met regularly: “The ties between Masson and Pourchot dated back to September 1, 1939. They saw each other often, notably at the Odéon café, near Bern City Hall. »
It was to Pourchot that Colonel Masson entrusted the famous message announcing the German attack ten days in advance.
Colonel Masson also confirmed to Mr. Accoce that Pourchot had, upon receipt, himself taken this telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the General Headquarters of the army at Vincennes. That the Belgian General Maurice Delvoie, Belgian military attaché in Paris had, at the same time, alerted the French military authorities of this imminent risk.
The facts and the men have therefore been known to everyone since 1940 and proof of the existence of the message informing of the imminent German attack abounds in the books published by intelligence officers, or in specialized journals, such as the Bulletin de la Jura Society of Officers (Swiss), 34th section National Federation of S/Officers. Title of the article: “The German attack in May 1940”. From the pen of Captain Dunand, 2nd Bureau, deputy and contact of the French military attaché in Switzerland: “As of April 30, we received from Bern from a perfectly authorized and first-hand source (Roessler) the following information: L Germany will attack between 8 and 10 May. Stop. Main axis effort, Sedan. Stop. Planned occupation of Holland and Belgium, northern France in 10 days. Stop. Total occupation of France in one month. Stop. End “
Other testimonies confirm: “Alerts emanating from Berlin for Belgium and Holland, from Bern, on behalf of Belgium and France. Source in Switzerland? The service of Roger Masson, Swiss SR, via Commander Gaston Pourchot, French military attaché. »
End of quote (Captain Dimitry Queloz The Swiss Intelligence Service)
Apparently, in view of all these corroborating testimonies, Roessler and his Viking network, as well as the information he passed on, should figure prominently in the story of this battle.
But, surprisingly, it is not.
Better ! Some historiographers and journalists from all walks of life and from all countries still try to ignore, or even dispute, the existence of these warnings…
In order to leave no doubt about this desire for disinformation, I take the liberty of quoting here Mr. Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, a well-known Belgian expert who, on page 55 of his 1940 book Spotlight on a disaster published in 1996, more than 30 years after that of Pierre Accoce, but still abundantly quoted by all negationist authors, writes: “After the events, as if to restore the image of intelligence, there was much talk of a mysterious warning, issued on 30 April or May 1, by the French military attaché in Bern and prophesying, with variants according to the versions, the offensive for May 8 or 10, with Sedan as the point of application of the main effort. Holland, Belgium and the French North being occupied in 10 days, France in a month. The proof of this message has never been provided and it is all the more regrettable that it would offer a rare example of premonitions since, on April 30 or May 1, Hitler did not know himself that he would open fire on May 10. His decision only fell the day before. »
By inventing from scratch this decisive message from Roessler, the leaders of the French Intelligence Services would therefore have wanted to clear themselves of customs by making the politicians take the blame.
And of course, if we consider the brilliant university titles Mr. Vanwelkenhuyzen: Doctor of political and diplomatic sciences, graduate in economics and financial sciences, and noting that he is in this capacity: director of the Center for Research and histories of the Second World War, secretary general of the International Committee for the History of the Second World War and Vice-president of the Belgian National Committee for Historical Sciences, one cannot but be very impressed by such an affirmation.
 The author in question, to support his demonstration, quotes: General Rivet: Were we informed in May 1941: In National Defense Review July 1950 Page 36. But also: Gauché page 211, Reynaud page 422, Henri Navarre , the intelligence service page 110.
Except that … Colonel Gauché, whom he quotes, is formal in his testimony (published in 1953): “The SR, for its part, brings the precious indications received from its antennas which, for a long time, have been alerted. We reproduce them here, without disclosing the source, but respecting their laconic form; they will only be more striking:
From the beginning of April: “The German SR expects the Belgian border to be closed at the end of April. »
April 11: “Imminent operations in the west, watch out for military movements in the next few days. »
20 April: “German SR personnel abandon their parking places in Belgium”.
May 1: “The German army will attack between May 8 and May 10 along the entire front, including the Maginot Line. The region of Sedan, Belgium, Holland and the French north will be occupied in ten days, France in a month. »
May 2: “Imminent closure of Belgian and Dutch borders”
Night of May 5 to 6: “Next general offensive which will encompass the Netherlands. »
May 6: “The antenna of the German SR of Stuttgart stationed in Luxembourg folds up. Attack ready. The French army, it is said in the circles of the German command, will be unable to stop the armored formations in the open countryside.
May 8 (by way of Italy): “Attack for this very day. »
May 9: “Attack on the 10th, at daybreak. »
This information was preceded by the event. He did not reach the SR until the German attack had just begun. »
End of quote (Left, The second Bureau at work page 211)
In addition to this perfectly explicit testimony, many others, including that of General Navarre at the time, a member of the SRs and head of the Germany department, or of Paul Reynaud, who combined the functions of Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, confirm that their services had received this message on May 1st.
General Louis Rivet, in his book Carnets d’un chef des Services Secrets 1936-1944, also reports that the 2nd Bureau had been warned by the Swiss SRs of an imminent attack in the Sedan sector, while other witnesses attest that Major Pourchot delivered this information personally to the GHQ of Vincennes, therefore to Generalissimo Gamelin, but also to the N°2 of the Army, General Georges.
So who should you believe? These senior French and Swiss military and political leaders, or a brilliant representative of official history who believes that only the hero of his own book, Colonel Oster of the Abwehr, deserves the attention of the Center for Research and Historical studies of the Second World War, the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, and the Belgian National Committee for Historical Sciences?
To decide between them, let us consider the bases of Mr. Vanwelkenhuyzen’s argument by leaning, as he did, on the German documents according to which, on May 1, Hitler had fixed the date of the offensive at the 5th, then the reported several times:
On May 8, we learn from Jodl: “Alarming news from Holland. Cancellation of permissions, evacuations, roadblocks, other mobilization measures… Führer does not want to wait any longer. Göring asks for at least 10. Führer very agitated, then agrees to postpone until the 10th, which is contrary to his intuition he says. But not one more day”
(quoted by Shirer The Fall of the Third Republic)
Apparently, Hitler was indeed hesitant.
Mr Vanwelkenhuyzen’s arguments therefore seem admissible.
And in any case if we do not think further because, on the one hand, the approximate date was fixed by Hitler as of April 27 and not May 1, as evidenced on this date in his diary by General Jodl, chief of Hitler’s personal staff: “the Führer intends to launch the yellow plan between the first and the 7th of May. »
This allows us to understand how Roessler’s friends have already been able to estimate the probable date as early as April 31.
On the other hand, it had to be decided on the basis of two elements:
1st element: The weather, very unfavorable at the beginning of May.
However, to make the most of Hitler’s best weapon, aviation, it needed good weather over a long period. A thinning, even of a day or two, was not enough.
This is why on the evening of the 9th, when the head of the Luftwaffe weather service finally announces to his Führer that the sky will be cloudless the next day, this good news pushes the latter to offer him a superb gold watch.
But does this gesture mean that, since April 30, this weather specialist had been unable, at least approximately, to predict the period of bad weather which was to extend from May 1 to 9?
A storm in May, especially if it is powerful enough to block aviation, is easily identifiable. We are not talking here of a simple period of bad weather in winter, but of an important and exceptional phenomenon, all the characteristics of which were perfectly known to Marshal Hermann Goering, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, who, having the high hand on the meteorological services, had assigned naval launches and submarines, stationed in the Arctic regions to weather surveillance.
However, at the beginning of May, all the specialists were unanimous: There would be a period of exceptional good weather between May 10 and 17: “The reports then specify that the winds will be “weak or moderate with a predominance of currents coming from the north. Their average speed will reach six meters per second. The sky should be partly cloudy. In the valleys morning fog is to be expected, but no precipitation will occur. The average temperature will remain around 14 degrees. In the Ardennes light night frosts are possible, but the days will be bright, with excellent visibility. »
End of quote (Berben and Iselin The Panzers cross the Meuse page 36)
Thus, that this parameter actually played an important role is not debatable. On the other hand, that he was the only one to have delayed the attack is to be ruled out since the end could be foreseen well before the evening of the 9th.
2nd element: The ultimatum that Hitler had planned to send to neutral countries in order to politically justify his attack.
Here are the terms of this document drawn up from May 3: “The German government has known for a long time that the real aim of England and France is the attack in the west against Germany, an attack carefully prepared and the day before it comes true. And which consists of pushing a point towards the territories of the Ruhr, passing through the territories of Belgium and Holland. (-) The government of Germany does not intend, in this struggle for existence imposed on the German people by England and France, to wait until the war is carried on German territory. He has just given the German troops the order to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the means of military force at Germany’s disposal. »
On this subject, the archives tell us that the Wilhelmstrasse (German Foreign Ministry) will come up against an unforeseen problem because, for his part, the King of the Belgians, perfectly informed by his ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Davignon, will employ all the means from May 8 to prevent the ultimatum from reaching him, notably closing his border to emissaries.
Episode, again, “forgotten” by Mr Vanwelkenhuyzen in his reasoning.
So my questions are:
1° Given these difficulties, was it difficult to foresee that the attack would be delayed?
2° Was Hitler expecting anything other than perfect weather or the delivery of his ultimatum? Like, for example, that the French high command was able to use the Pentecost weekend as a pretext to strip its northern front as appropriate?
In this order of idea, is it possible to imagine that the German democratic generals of the Viking network, by virtue of their position within the OKW, the OKH and the Abwehr, were informed that the permissions had been restored on the French side, and that the emissaries were having difficulty accomplishing their mission?
That they were able to integrate these different elements into their forecasts and therefore had a perfectly clear view of the situation as it stood on April 30?
This allowed them to estimate, given the diplomatic difficulties, the weather, and the Pentecost weekend, that the final date of the attack could not be before May 8 and more certainly the 10, when the weather would be favourable, and where 20% of the French army would actually be far from the front!
Knowing that Roessler’s correspondents were obviously better informed than Oster, – which all historians unanimously confirm – and therefore able to know, well before anyone else, the exact difficulties encountered at all levels, is it not it not logical to estimate that they had no difficulty in crossing all these parameters?
Thesis which would allow us to remove from the equation the possibility that the German and allied SRs would have had, as a common trait, to preferably employ deaf-mute, blind, and slightly deficient specialists in addition…
As for the ultimate reason why Hitler was so impatient, it is given to us on May 7 by the Diary of General Halder:
“The Führer is very excited. He has just been informed of a conversation between the Belgian ambassador to the Vatican and the Belgian foreign minister in Brussels, leading to the conclusion of treason from a German source. »
And all of this confirms that “everyone knew everything, about everyone” and that what the official fairy tale calls a “surprise” is just a big joke.
What we will still have a thousand times the opportunity to verify…
With regard to the value and the exceptional quality of the information communicated to the Swiss SRs, let us recall that in the period going from 1938 to 1941, Roessler and his friends will send twelve thousand single-spaced typed pages, the equivalent of forty normal books!
That is infinitely more than the information provided by Colonel Oster, the main character in Mr Vanwelkenhuyzen’s book.
And we understand that this is irritating for this expert!
Especially since the results obtained by Roessler were decisive on the ground, if not during the campaign in France or Poland for the reasons we have understood, but at least subsequently, on the Eastern Front, as well as General Guderian testifies:
“During the fighting in the kyiv pocket, the commanding general of the Soviet 5th Army was our prisoner on September 26. I had an interesting interview with him, during which I asked him a few questions:
– When did you learn that my tanks were deploying behind your back?
– Answer: “Around September 8”
General Heinz Guderian Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1951
As for the other “liars” castigated by Mr Vanwelkenhuyzen, they testify in the same way to the effectiveness of the “Viking-Lucy” network: “Lucy held in her hands the threads that went back to the three major commands of the German army… The he effect of his communications on the strategy of the Red Army and on the defeat of the Wehrmacht was considerable. »
Alexander Foote ex-Soviet secret agent – Handbook for Spies 1947
“The Soviets then exploited a fantastic source, located in Switzerland, a man named Rudolph Roessler who had the code name Lucy. By means which have not yet been clarified today, Roessler in Switzerland managed to obtain information from the German high command in Berlin at a fairly uninterrupted rate and often less than twenty-four hours after they had been arrested. day-to-day decisions about the Eastern Front. »
Allen Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency – The technique of intelligence Paris 1964
Finally, since it seems that Mr. Vanwelkenhuyzen only takes into account, like so many of his colleagues, what can support his own contribution to the Blitzkrieg thesis, I propose to settle the question by recalling that in 1941, during of the Riom trial, President Caous and Attorney General Cassagneau – after having heard the testimonies of the highest officials of the French SRs – were able to draw the following conclusions:
“The mobilization of the German army was followed unit by unit, without any gaps or errors.
– The same was true of the concentration of German units facing Poland, on the one hand, and France, Denmark, Belgium and Holland, on the other.
– The distribution of forces has always been perfectly indicated to the French High Command, during the Polish campaign, during the interval between the Polish and French campaigns.
– The transfer to the West of the large units having taken part in the Polish campaign was entirely monitored by the French S.R., without ever losing sight of a large German unit for more than 24 hours.
– The German position on the eve of May 10, 1940 was known in the smallest details, as well as the possibilities of maneuver that it carried in germ.
– The date and place of the attack of May 10, 1940 were communicated to the French Command with some reservations from the end of March 1940, and, with certainty, from April 1940. (Emphasis mine)
– The constitution of the German land and air forces has been kept up to date without gaps and that as well for their composition as for their equipment and their weapons, and, however paradoxical it may seem, the French S.R. of the German army a rather overestimated description: this is how the number of tanks of the German armored divisions was overestimated by 10 to 15%, due to the fact that the factory outputs were behind the forecasts.
– During the campaign in France most of the German movements were identified from start to finish. In particular each armored division was followed without any error thanks to the interception and the exploitation of all the command messages of the large German units. Thus could be announced and described: the attack on the Meuse, the march towards the Channel, the regroupings for the attacks on the Somme, in Champagne, etc., etc.
The Court even paid tribute to the efficiency and foresight of the secret services…
As for what concerns the indubitable material proof, therefore the original message, we know that the archives of the Quai d’Orsay were burned on May 16, 1940 in the morning. A huge fire in the courtyard of the ministry in which the telegrams, including those emanating from Bern, went up in smoke. A few years later, numerous documents seized by the Wehrmacht from an abandoned train in Charité-sur-Loire were also burned during the fall of Berlin. These famous telegrams and their copies have therefore been destroyed.
But does this authorize the most renowned historians to affirm that they never existed?
Finally, and since the aim here is to put an end to this false controversy, can Mr Vanwelkenhuyzen explain to us why he did not mention in his work, published in 1982, the book by Mrs Amort and Jedlicka: On called it A 54, published by Robert Laffont in 1966 which revealed the existence of another agent, Paul Thümmel, who gave exactly the same information as Roessler and within the same time frame?
Ditto for that of Mrs Paul Berben and Bernard Iselin, two excellent revisionist authors who published in 1969, in their perfectly documented work Les Panzer passers la Meuse, the list of officers having confirmed that this message had reached other Allied staffs . (text already quoted above on April 30)
Same question for the book of General Paul Paillole, at that time responsible for the Germany service.
Testimony published in 1975, therefore seven years before the work of this “expert”: “The imminence of a German offensive appeared to the English. On May 2, a meeting of the heads of departments of the second and fifth French and British Bureaus takes place at the British Embassy. Our information is compared with that of our allies. The connections are further strengthened. The security of British troops operating in France will be provided by our B.C.R.s, to whom British security officers will be added.
Bertrand’s services (thanks to the Enigma machine) reveal the preparation of air attacks on our airfields every day. On May 6, the antenna of the German S. R. of Stuttgart installed in Luxembourg folds. »
End of quote (Paillole Special Services page 188)
“May 2” … Two days after the messages from Roessler from Bern, Commander Munier from Budapest, and Paul Thümmel from Prague. And the confirmation that these messages were also transmitted to the British SRs. That they were studied jointly by the two services.
In addition, we know that the British SRs will be informed by their agent Sator of the date of the attack on May 7.
And we suspect that these must have had other sources, still unknown to historians.
In conclusion, all this confirms that a certain form of Holocaust denial, directed very precisely in order to evade the fact that the Allies knew not only the day and the date of the attack, but also since March 10, 1940 the Manstein plan in all its details, seems always practiced by the highest European and even world university authorities, since the contributions of Roessler, Thümmel, Munier and Sator are systematically evaded or denied by the historiographers, especially the most prestigious.
We are therefore faced with a major attempt at disinformation.
As early as May 1940, many members of the French Intelligence Services had been unable to ignore the ongoing betrayal.
They were the ones who founded, upon defeat, the first networks of resistance in occupied France and in the free zone and, even if they never openly denounced it, their writings will often go against the State thesis. .
And we are here in a real dissidence within the army, because the officers loyal to Pétain will return their jacket by joining these networks, only after the German armies are blocked in front of Moscow, then Stalingrad in autumn 1942, and for the slowest after the American landing in North Africa on November 8, 1942. So following the occupation of the free zone and once Germany’s defeat was certain.
This very particular caste of the military corporation, republican and resistant at heart, therefore suffered, not only from what they knew to be a betrayal, but also from the pack effect which made these intelligence specialists post-war capable and effective, the laughing stock of the “experts” and the shame of the Army.
Which brings us to this rebellion of the SRs, much more difficult to manage than when it was a question of silencing Republican officers without exact knowledge of the underside of treason, or a generalissimo at the end of his tether, worn out by polemics.
Because this is where a simple journalist comes into the picture, without much power, but curious about everything…
We see the reappearance of the Roessler constant
Indeed, when Mrs Pierre Accoce and Pierre Quet had their work published on the Roessler network in 1965, it had an international impact. Hollywood wants to make a movie out of it, the authors participate in countless reports, or television shows at prime time.
In short, there is a great risk of seeing the curiosity of some historians aroused by this new light. This is all the more so since the Ministry of Defence, always so anxious to make the evidence disappear, should no doubt have been unaware that for their part Messrs. Amort and Jedlicka, at the end of their own investigation, were preparing to release their work On called it A 54, published by Robert Laffont in 1966.
It therefore became imperative to add a few meshes to the net of lies.
This is what Mr. Vanwelkenhuyzen and a few others, whom we know well today because they are just as devoted as he is to maintaining the family secret, did.
Having said this, it is not useless to understand how Mr. Accoce was able to find the traces of Rudolf Roessler, by interesting us in one of the most discreet heroes of this battle in the shadows:
Captain Henri Trautmann.
Born in 1901 in Woerth in Alsace, appointed in 1948 to the Directorate of Military and Economic Policy Research at the External Documentation and Counterintelligence Service (S.D.E.C).
He directed the Service Action there in the 1960s, under the direction of General Paul Jacquier, companion of the Liberation, one of the first airmen to have joined the Royal Air Force to continue the fight in June 1940, then the Free French Forces.
To understand the exact circumstances of the entry into play of this other piece of the chessboard, let’s go back to 1963, the date of his meeting with Pierre Accoce, when he was close to retirement and kept in service as an agent of liaison of the S.D.E.C between the action service and the services of the Prime Minister at Matignon.
At that time, he still maintained relations of trust and deep friendship with a “former” SR, predecessor of Paul Jacquier at the head of the SDEC, General Paul Joseph Roger Grossin.
This other irreducible Republican born in 1901 in Oran, had been assigned from September 1939 to May 1940, to the staff of the Fifth Army, that of General Bourret, one of the most active Republican officers in the army, that who, tirelessly, will denounce the efforts of La Cagoule to infiltrate her and whom we have already met several times during our investigation.
During this period, his Chief of Staff was General de Lattre de Tassigny and, we remember, the tank commander Colonel de Gaulle!
It is therefore understandable to what extent these “bad associations” would quickly have an unfortunate influence on him since, taken prisoner at the end of June 1940 in the Vosges, he was not long in escaping and joined France where he joined a group of resistance fighters. affiliated with the Combat group. This will cause him to be removed from the executives by the Vichy government in December 1941. It is within this network that he prepares the Allied landings in Algeria.
Then he joined the Free French Forces of General De Gaulle, alongside his friend de Lattre and it was together that they prepared the landing in Provence and went back to Paris.
After a long period at the General Staff of the Armed Forces, he was appointed in 1957 boss of the S.D.E.C. A function that he will hand over to his companion and friend in resistance, General Paul Jacquet, the one who so obligingly guided Mr. Accoce, through Commander Trautmann, behind the dark scenes of the battle…
A difficult and tortuous maneuver that allowed us to understand how President de Gaulle, then in power, but in this time of the Cold War very concerned with restoring France’s independence from the United States and the Soviet Union, had decided to take revenge on his anti-Republican enemies.
Because nothing was done without his agreement…
Thus, the loop is complete, and we understand better by what other magic trick, the little journalist of the Express was able to find the “forgotten” track of Rudolf Roessler’s Viking network.
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